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Appendix A 
Disclosure of the Policymaker’s Signal to a Subset of the Private Sector 
 
   Here  we  consider  an  alternative  representation  of  the  extent  to  which  the 
policymaker reveals its information publicly. Specifically, we follow Cornand and 
Heinemann (2008) in assuming that the policymaker communicates its private signal, 
without the introduction of any additional noise, to a fraction of private sector agents: 
the remainder of the private sector then has access only to their own agent-specific 
information.  The  proportion  of  agents,  Q,  who  observe  the  policymaker’s  signal 
which, henceforth, we refer to as the ‘public’ signal, is viewed as a choice variable of 
the  policymaker.  Hence,  the  approach  provides  an  alternative  characterization  of 
transparency to that employed in the paper, with the value of Q representing a natural 
measure of the degree of public disclosure by the policymaker. 
   The principal features of the model are unchanged from the paper, with the payoff 
function  of  individual  agents  remaining  as  described  by  equation  (1).  The  crucial 
amendment relates to the underlying informational assumptions: now  z y º , but is 
only observed by a fraction Q of the private sector. Identifying all agents who observe 
z with a superscript I (for ‘Informed’) we have: 
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The optimal action of all agents continues to be determined according to equation (8) 
of the paper. Hence for an informed agent: 
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Considering now agents who have access only to their own private information, with 
such agents identified by a superscript U (Uninformed): 
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It follows that actions based only on agents’ private signals are described by: 
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Assuming each agent’s action to be a linear function of the signals observed, then: 
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The  average  action  of  all  agents,  a ,  is  a  weighted  average  of 
I
i a   and 
U
i a ,  each 
aggregated over the respective set of agents. From the properties of  i x : 
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Substituting (A.6) into (A.2) and (A.4), then equating coefficients with (A.5a) and 
(A.5b) allows us to solve for 
I
1 k , 
I
2 k  and 
U
1 k : 
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   The measure of welfare adopted is a weighted average of the expected payoffs of 
informed and uninformed agents, with weights Q and  Q - 1  respectively. Substituting 
(A.5a)  and  (A.5b),  together  with  the  policy  rule,  into  equation  (1)  of  the  paper, 
aggregating  with  appropriate  partitioning  of  the  integral  and  taking  expectations 
yields: 
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Differentiating the above expression with respect to  r , then substituting for 
I
1 k , 
I
2 k   
and 
U
1 k , allows us to determine the optimal value of the rule parameter: 
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Now using our expressions for 
I
1 k , 
I
2 k , 
U
1 k  and 
* r  to substitute into (A.8), we find 
expected welfare with r  set optimally: 
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The  central  issue  is  now  the  relationship  between  welfare  and  the  proportion  of 
agents, Q, to whom the policymaker’s signal is communicated. Differentiating the 
above expression with respect to Q: 
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It is directly evident that this expression is strictly negative for  0
2 > e s ,  0
2 > f s , i.e. 
social welfare is strictly decreasing in Q. It follows that the optimal value of Q is zero 
and,  thus,  the  policymaker  should  not  share  its  private  signal  with  any  subset  of 
private sector agents.   4 
Appendix B 
Equilibrium with Discretionary Policymaking 
 
   This  Appendix  analyzes  the  scenario  in  which  the  policymaker  does  not/cannot 
precommit to set its policy instrument g in accordance with a rule: thus equation (9) 
no longer forms part of the model. Instead, it is assumed that following the realization 
of  the  policymaker’s  private  signal  z  and  of  the  related  public  signal  y,  the 
policymaker  has  the  freedom  to  set  g  at  any  value  it  sees  fit;  we  refer  to  this 
alternative scenario as ‘discretion’. This modification amounts to a departure from the 
paper’s implicit assumption regarding the timing of moves. In the rule scenario the 
policy-response coefficient  r  in (9) is determined in advance of the realization of the 
model’s exogenous stochastic variables, and hence also prior to the setting of g. In 
contrast, under discretion the policy responses to z and y (which imply a particular 
choice of g) are determined after the realization of those signals and simultaneously 
with  the  selection  by  private  agents  of  their  moves.  This  apart,  our  assumptions 
remain  as  in  the  paper:  thus  equations  (1)  to  (8)  describing  payoffs,  information 
structure and the representative agent’s individually optimal action continue to be of 
relevance, while the objective of policy is once again the maximization of expected 
welfare. 
   In  the  current  scenario,  it  is  appropriate  to  allow  for  the  possible  existence  of 
equilibria  which  feature  a  non-zero  (unconditional)  mean  action  for  each  private-
sector agent. For this reason, the equivalent of (10) for discretion is: 
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1 A straightforward optimization exercise then yields 
the  policymaker’s  setting  of  its  instrument,  for  given  values  of  the  private-sector 
coefficients in (B.1): 
 
                                                 
1 As in the paper,  (.) g E  denotes the expectation  ) , | (. y z E , while we again use  (.) i E  to denote agent 
i’s expectation  ) , | (. y x E i .   5 





= ∫ di i e , the aggregate private-sector action is now  y a 2 1 0 k q k k + + = . Agent 
i’s expectation of this, and of the setting of g, will therefore be: 
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where  ) (q i E  and  ) (z Ei  are given by equations (5) and (6) of the paper. Substituting 
(5), (6), (B.3a) and (B.3b) into (8) allows us to express agent i’s individually optimal 
action in terms of a constant and responses to the two signals it observes. Equating 
this constant and the two response coefficients with their counterparts in (B.1) then 
yields  three  simultaneous  equations  which  must  hold  in  any  equilibrium.  Solving 
these equations for  0 k ,  1 k  and  2 k , we find a unique solution for  1 k : on the other 
hand, the values of  0 k  and  2 k  are indeterminate. The equilibrium action of agent i, 
and the policymaker’s equilibrium choice of instrument setting, are thus described by: 
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where  0 k  and  2 k  each take a value common to all agents. An important aspect of 
discretion,  therefore,  is  that  whereas  the  players’  equilibrium  responses  to  their 
private items of information (i.e.  i x  or z) are uniquely determined by the model’s 
structural parameters, this is not the case as regards either their equilibrium responses 
to the signal which is commonly known, y, or the mean value of their action (or 
instrument setting). In formal terms, the model with discretion has an infinite set of   6 
equilibria, which share the same private-sector response to private signals,  i x , and 
also  have  in  common  a  particular  policy  response  to  the  private  signal  z.  The 
equilibria  differ,  however,  in  respect  of  both  the  value  of  the  players’  common 
response to y, and the mean value of their action or instrument. These differences 
across equilibria are not consequential for welfare. This is because the mutual nature 
of the players’ response to y is sufficient in itself to neutralize y’s impact on each 
agent’s utility and on expected welfare, and this is so regardless of the particular value 
of the common response to y. (A similar comment pertains to the mean action and 
mean instrument setting.) 
   The  intuition  for  the  indeterminacy  of  2 k   (and  0 k )  under  discretion  becomes 
apparent when we note that agent i has a beauty-contest motivation for responding to 
y (and for setting  0 k ) in precisely the same way as every other agent. At the same 
time, the term  g ai - -q , which is central to welfare, implies that the policymaker 
will wish to adjust g in response to y to neutralize fully the potential welfare impact of 
the  representative  agent’s  response  to  that  signal.  Hence  the  players’  equilibrium 
responses  to  y  are  identical  and  are  payoff-neutral  for  all  parties,  implying  any 
common value for  2 k  is consistent with this outcome: a similar logic explains the 
indeterminacy of  0 k . (Note that it is the heterogeneity of the  i x  private signals which 
ultimately accounts for the uniqueness of  1 k .) Given this identical common response 
to  y,  the  policymaker’s  expectation  of  g ai - -q   becomes  simply 
z z x E
D D
i g ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 r k r q k - - = - - , where  1 k  has its unique equilibrium value, and 
where 
D r   is  the  policymaker’s  response  to  its  private  signal  z  under  discretion. 
Clearly, the policymaker’s optimal response to z is also unique, and equal to  1 1 - k . 
   At this point it is useful to compare the above findings with those of the wider 
‘global games’ literature. The themes present in the preceding analysis are familiar 
from  this  literature,  which  stems  from  the  seminal  contribution  by  Carlsson  and 
VanDamme  (Econometrica,  1993).  The  existence  of  multiple  equilibria  is  jointly 
attributable to three aspects of the game. First, there is common knowledge regarding 
the variable y. Second, every player, including the policymaker, chooses his or her 
response  to  y  simultaneously.  Third,  the  variable  y  is  not  merely  a  signal  of  the 
fundamental, but is also itself a component of that fundamental (i.e. of  g + q , the   7 
state of the world, as modified by policy intervention), which agents are attempting to 
estimate.  This  third  feature  has  a  particular  importance  as  regards  the  multiple 
equilibria which characterize the game under discretion: note that it is its absence 
from the original Morris and Shin (2002) model which ensures that that particular 
global game’s equilibrium is unique. 
   We  conclude  by  briefly  commenting  on  the  welfare  properties  of  the  equilibria 
associated with discretion. The variance of the public-signal additional noise term, 
2
x s ,  is  notably  absent  from  (B.4a)  and  (B.4b),  and  plays  no  part  in  determining 
expected welfare, which is given by: 
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Comparison with (15) reveals that this is the welfare outcome associated with full 
disclosure  of  the  policymaker’s  private  signal  z  (in  which  case  rule-based 
policymaking would be completely ineffective). Notational differences apart, it is also 
identical to expected welfare in the original Morris and Shin model without policy 
intervention  (as  given  by  equation  (17)  of  their  paper).  It  is  clear  from  this  that 
commitment  to  the  optimal  rule  is,  in  welfare  terms,  unambiguously  superior  to 
discretion; all the more so when commitment is accompanied by zero disclosure. In 
the latter instance, of course, the fact that the rule then replicates the first-best welfare 
outcome implies that it cannot possibly be bettered by any alternative policy regime. 
   8 
Appendix C 
Persistence of Shocks 
 
   Here the model’s assumptions are modified to allow the state of the world variable, 
q , to follow a first-order autoregressive process. Our aim is to establish whether, and 
to  what  extent,  this  dynamic  extension  affects  the  key  results  of  our  paper.  The 
framework of Section I is largely retained but, with the state now specified to be 
AR(1), we have: 
 
(C.1a)      t t t d mq q + = -1  
 
where the autocorrelation parameter  ) 1 , 0 [ Î m  measures the degree of persistence of 
the state, and  t d  is a stochastic innovation whose prior distribution is uniform over the 
real line. 
   Crucially, we assume that the policymaker’s choice of instrument setting in any 
period is observable with a one-period lag: hence, in making their decisions relating to 
period t actions, for example, private sector agents have exact knowledge of  1 - t g . This 
knowledge allows an inference concerning the value of  1 - t z  to be made which, given 
the autoregressive process which q  follows, provides public information relevant to 
the  realization  of  t q .  We  further  specify  that  a  particular  realization  of  the  state 
becomes known to all parties after a lag of two periods.
2 Thus, at time t the most 
recent q  realization currently observable by all participants is that which occurred in 
period  2 - t . Consequently, at time t,   2 - t q  (and  2 > " - j j t q ) is common knowledge 
among all the game’s players (both the policymaker and the private agents), whereas 
they are heterogeneously and imperfectly informed regarding  1 - t q  and  t q .  
   Since the AR(1) process implies that  1 2 1 - - - + = t t t d mq q , we may combine this with 
(C.1a) to obtain: 
 
                                                 
2 Although the choice of a two-period lag may appear somewhat arbitrary, we note that the assumption 
of a single-period lag would effectively return us to the framework of the paper, while generalizing to a 
k-period lag leaves our results unaffected in any essential way. This latter generalization is briefly 
considered following our treatment of the case of a two-period lag.   9 
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Note that, since the innovations are assumed to be i.i.d.,  . 0 ) ( 1 = - t t E d d  
   So far as the information structure is concerned, we assume that the signals received 
by an individual agent in a particular period,  , j t -  relate to that period’s innovation 
j t- d . Private sector agent i’s signals are therefore: 
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where  j t i - , e   and  j t- x   are  independent  and  serially  uncorrelated  noise  terms  with 
respective  known  distributions    ) , 0 ( ~
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denotes the policymaker’s own noisy signal of  j t- d : 
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where the  j t- f  noise terms are i.i.d. with known distribution  ) , 0 ( ~
2
f s f N j t- . 
   In the present context, we specify the policy rule to take the form:
3 
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The setting of the policy instrument in period  1 - t  (i.e. the value of  1 - t g ) is assumed 
to  become  common  knowledge  throughout  the  economy  before  agents  make  their 
action choices for period t. This setting will be given by: 
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3 As in the paper itself, we assume that precommitment to a rule of this kind is possible. Note in 
addition that, since  2 - t q  is known to every agent at time t, including an additional term in  2 - t z  in the 
rule (so that  2 3 1 2 1 2 0 - - - + + + = t t t t t z z z g r r r q r ), would in no way affect the reported findings (in other 
words, the policy coefficient  3 r  would be redundant).   10 
With  3 - t q ,  2 - t z  and the rule coefficients known (or precisely inferable) at time t, it is 
clear that  1 - t z  will be inferable from the value of  1 - t g  observed by agents at t.
4  
   In forming its estimates of  t q  and  t g  at time t, agent i will make optimal use of the 
items of information  2 - t q ,  t i x , ,  t y ,  1 , - t i x  and  1 - t z , while the presence of the last of 
these in i’s information set implies that  1 - t y  will be of no informative value in these 
forecasting  exercises.  Using  our  familiar  notation  ) . ( i E   for  agent  i’s  rational 
expectation,  so  that  ) , , , , | ( ) ( 1 1 , , 2 - - - º t t i t t i t t t i z x y x E E q q q ,  for  example,  the  optimal 
forecasts are found to be: 
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   As  in  the  paper,  we  solve  for  the  individual  private-sector  agent’s  equilibrium 
response  coefficients  using  the  method  of  undetermined  coefficients.  Agent  i’s 
individually optimal equation is once again given by equation (8). In a symmetric 
equilibrium, all agents have identical response coefficients, such that: 
                                                 
4  The  assumption  that  2 - t z   is  known  at  time  t  is  easily  justified  here,  since  with  rule-based 
policymaking  2 - t z  will be precisely inferable at t provided at least one antecedent realization of this 
signal (i.e. some  j t z -  where  2 > j ) is known to private agents at time t. (For example, if  4 - t z  is known 
at t, then  3 - t z  can be inferred exactly from  4 2 3 1 5 0 3 - - - - + + = t t t t z z g r r q r , which in turn implies that 
2 - t z  is perfectly inferable from the counterpart expression for  2 - t g .)   11 
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where the equilibrium values of the coefficients  0 k ,  1 k ,  2 k ,  3 k  and  4 k , remain to be 







1 , - - = ∫ t t i di x d . Hence, in equilibrium, the average action,  ∫ º
1
0
di a a i , and agent 
i’s rational expectation thereof, will respectively be given by: 
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Substituting equations (C.4a) to (C.4e), as well as (C.5c), into (8), and then collecting 
terms in  2 - t q ,  t i x , ,  t y ,  1 , - t i x  and  1 - t z  yields an equation which, like (C.5a), must hold 
in  equilibrium.  Equating  the  coefficients  in  this  resultant  equation  with  their 
counterparts in (C.5a) yields five simultaneous equations which can be solved for the 
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium set of coefficient values: 
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Agent i’s equilibrium action is therefore:   12 
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Note  that  the  equilibrium  solutions  for  1 k   and  2 k   are  independent  of  the 
autocorrelation parameter  m , and furthermore are identical to the equilibrium values 
taken by these coefficients in the version of the model in which the state of the world 
does not exhibit any persistence (i.e. the  0 º m  case considered in the paper). With 







1 ) ( ) 1 ( di g a di u r W i i q ,  it  is 
insightful to consider the equilibrium expression for  t t i g a - -q  for this version of the 
model. Appropriate substitutions involving (C.1a), (C.3a) and (C.6a) yield  t t i g a - -q  
in terms of the noise realizations in periods t and  1 - t : 
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A noteworthy aspect of (C.7a) is that the autocorrelation parameter  m  is absent from 
the first three terms, and only affects current-period welfare through the earlier-period 
noise terms ( 1 - t f  and  1 , - t i e ). Even more significantly, the terms in  1 - t f  and  1 , - t i e  do 
not  feature  the  policy-rule  coefficients.  This  implies,  of  course,  that  the  optimal 
setting of the policy-rule response to the  authorities’ current private signal,  t z , is 
identical  to  the  optimal-rule  response  to  t z   stated  in  the  paper  as  equation  (14).
5 
Furthermore, the coefficients on  1 - t f  and  1 , - t i e  in (C.7a) are also independent of 
2
x s , 
indicating that the relationship between expected welfare under the optimal rule and 
                                                 
5 Consequently, with the response coefficients in (C.3a) set optimally, the optimal rule is found to be 
1 2 2 0 -
*
- + + = t t t t z z g r r q r , where 
* r  is given by (14), and  0 r  and  2 r  may be chosen arbitrarily.   13 
2
x s  is qualitatively identical to that which holds when q  does not have a persistent 
component. Thus expected welfare is described by: 
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where 
* r  is given by (14), and  Y  by the right-hand side of (15). It directly follows 
that  0 ) | (
2
1 > ¶ ¶ * = x r r s qt t W E , as found in the paper: hence Proposition 1 survives 
intact when the model is modified to allow the state of the world to exhibit AR(1) 
persistence. 
   The sole remaining point of interest is whether this optimal combination of rule and 
zero disclosure replicates the first-best welfare outcome, i.e. that which results when 
there is full disclosure of the authorities’ information, and agents co-ordinate their 
actions in a socially efficient manner. In the present context, this would involve an 
individual action of the following form: 
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Performing an optimization exercise similar to that described in Section III of the 
paper reveals the following to be the unique collectively optimal action for agent i: 
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Expected welfare under collectively-optimal private-sector co-ordination is: 
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Equilibrium expected welfare under the optimal rule combined with zero disclosure is 
found by taking the limit of (C.8a) as  ¥ ®
2
x s : 
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Comparison  of  (C.11a)  and  (C.12a)  reveals  that  although  equilibrium  welfare  is 
maximized  by  an  optimal  policy  rule  combined  with  zero  disclosure,  it  does  not 
replicate the first-best outcome when  0 > m , i.e. when q  is described by an AR(1) 
process. Thus Proposition 2 of the paper is not robust to this modification of the basic 
framework. 
   Generalizing to the case in which  k t- q  (where  2 ³ k ) is the most recent realization 
of  q  known to all agents at time t, the counterpart expressions to (C.6a), (C.7a), 
(C.8a), (C.10a) and (C.11a) are as follows: 
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where  j r  is the coefficient on  j t z -  in the policy rule  ∑
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   As a first step towards understanding these results, note that as k increases and  k t- q  
becomes  more  remote  from  the  current  period  (t),  the  average  accuracy  of  the 
representative  agent’s  forecasts  of  t q   necessarily  deteriorates,  since  additional 
innovations must be estimated, while the additional signals available to the agent are 
only  of  value  in  forecasting  the  innovation  to  which  they  relate.  Because  the 
collectively-optimal strategy requires each agent to set his or her action equal to their 
private rational expectation of the current state,  t q , it follows that associated expected 
welfare (which is simply minus one times the representative agent’s mean squared 
forecast error in respect of  t q ) must decrease as the lag length k increases.
7 
   This phenomenon implies equilibrium welfare is also reduced if  k t- q  becomes more 
temporally distant from  t q . Importantly, however, the presence of the beauty-contest 
term in (1) implies that equilibrium welfare falls as k increases for a second reason, 
namely that a greater number of payoff-relevant and commonly-known public signals 
available  to  agents  at  t  inevitably  exacerbates  the  externality  characterizing  their 
equilibrium  actions.  In  the  present  context,  this  externality  can  be  viewed  as 
comprised of a sum of adverse externalities, one arising in relation to each of the 
innovations  that  agent  I  forecasts,  or,  alternatively,  to  each  of  the  public  signals 
received. It is intuitively clear that the policymaker has no means of mitigating the 
externalities  which  arise  in  connection  with  private  agents’  estimates  of  the 
                                                 
7 Differentiation of (C.11b) confirms this reasoning: 
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innovations  relating  to  periods  prior  to  the  present.  This  is  because,  first,  the 
observability  of  previous-period  instrument  settings,  and  hence  the  exact 
predictability of those components of the current setting, gt, which are responses to 
k t t t z z z - - - , ... , , 2 1 ,  implies  a  policy-neutrality  result  obtains  in  respect  of  these 
components. Second, the policymaker has no means of noise-obscuring these public 
items of information: this is significant, since it is each agent’s excessive reaction 
(motivated by beauty-contest considerations) to these  k t t t z z z - - - , ... , , 2 1  signals which 
directly engenders an externality in respect of each of them. 
   The  non-robustness  of  Proposition  2  to  the  modifications  of  our  original  model 
considered  here  is  therefore  not  surprising,  since  the  policymaker  has  no  power 
whatsoever to affect the externalities originating in current-period private-sector over-
reactions to earlier-period public signals. Thus the additional welfare losses arising 
from these externalities have to be taken as given by the policymaker. Nonetheless, a 
modified  version  of  Proposition  2  can  be  seen  to  obtain,  in  that  optimal  policy 
combined with zero disclosure of the policymaker’s private current signal can ensure 
a first-best outcome in relation to current-period innovations. 